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This article analyzes some of the potential issues that may arise 
during epidemics or other public health emergencies. It 
specifically focuses on legal and operational preparedness 
experiences at Emory University during the 2014 Ebola crisis. 
Emory University Hospital was the first health care facility in 
the U.S. to treat patients diagnosed with Ebola Viral Disease 
(EVD). Although EVD has particularly frightening symptoms 
and a high mortality rate, its containment and treatment 
implicate similar legal, practical, and operational issues as 
other highly infectious and communicable diseases. These issues 
include laws related to: isolation and quarantine; travel 
restrictions; duties to treat highly infectious patients; 
implications of the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Active Labor Act (EMTALA); health care workers’ rights to a 
safe working environment, workers’ compensation, medical 
leave; confidentiality protections afforded by the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule; disability protections for patients under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA); and crisis standards of care and 
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negligence claims. Practical and operational issues are also 
explored for hospitals and other health providers to consider 
when facing a public health emergency or other publicized event 
involving patients with infectious conditions. Hospitals, health 
care workers, and public health officials can take guidance from 
these experiences to develop their own response plans in the 
future. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It was July 30, 2014, a typical hot and humid summer afternoon at 
Emory University Hospital (Hospital) in Atlanta, Georgia. Emory’s 
campus was relatively quiet with students on their summer break. 
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Emory’s Special Containment Disease Unit (SCDU)1 was empty. 
Created in 2002 as a two-bed special isolation facility at the request of 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the SCDU was 
designed to treat CDC employees (either from its main headquarters in 
Atlanta or the field) exposed to or infected with dangerous pathogens. 
Since its creation, the SCDU had been used only twice. 
The day began like any other for many at Emory Hospital, including 
Dr. Bryce Gartland, a hospitalist and Vice President of Operations, Bob 
Bachman, the Hospital’s CEO, and Nancye Feistritzer, Chief Nursing 
Officer. They were unaware that officials from the U.S. Department of 
State visited the SCDU two days earlier. On the morning of July 30, the 
State Department called infectious disease specialist and SDCU director 
Dr. Bruce Ribner to ask if Emory would accept and treat Dr. Kent 
Brantly, an American who contracted Ebola Viral Disease (EVD) while 
on a medical mission in Liberia.2 Dr. Ribner quickly announced that 
Emory was to receive and treat Dr. Brantly, leading to two frenzied days 
of preparation prior to his arrival on August 2.3 
EVD is an emerging zoonotic viral disease that originally arose in 
rural areas of Central Africa. It was first identified in humans in 1976 in 
a remote hamlet of Zaïre (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) 
near the Ebola River.4 Humans contract EVD through direct physical 
contact with bodily fluids from an infected, clinically ill individual.5 It 
terrifies affected populations due to its hemorrhagic nature, causing 
massive bleeding, elimination of waste, and, in many instances, death. 
No vaccine or other type of therapeutic intervention is currently available 
                                                                                                             
1 Four hospitals in the United States (Emory; Nebraska Medical Center in Omaha; the 
National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, MD; and St. Patrick Hospital in Missoula, MT) 
have similar high containment units (HCUs) with select beds for isolating patients with 
highly infectious and dangerous diseases. 
2 Shortly thereafter, Emory was requested to treat a second American on the same 
medical mission, Nancy Writebol, who arrived at the Hospital on August 5, 2014. 
3 See Maria M. Lameiras, Ebola: From Microscope to Spotlight, EMORY MAG., 
Autumn 2014, at 18, 21, available at http://www.emory.edu/EMORY_MAGAZINE/
issues/2014/autumn/print.pdf. 
4 K.A. Alexander et al, What Factors Might Have Led to the Emergence of Ebola in 
West Africa?, PLOS (Nov. 11, 2014), http://blogs.plos.org/speakingofmedicine/2014/11/
11/factors-might-led-emergence-ebola-west-africa/ (citing Team RoaWIS (1978) Ebola 
haemorrhagic fever in Sudan, 1976. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 56: 247). 
5 Carol Clark, Disrupting the Balance, EMORY MED., Fall 2014, at 20, 21, available at 
http://emorymedicinemagazine.emory.edu/issues/2014/fall/print.pdf. Three fruit bat 
species are believed to be EVD’s “reservoir,” or the organism that carries the pathogen to 
other wildlife and humans without dying or becoming ill from it. Id. 
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for EVD beyond supportive care.6 Subsequent outbreaks have occurred 
sporadically since 1976, but most have dissipated quickly.7 
The 2014 outbreak in dense, poor urban areas of several West 
African nations is the exception.8 Lacking professional medical 
treatment, widespread transmission has been associated with home care 
and traditional burial practices that involve a great degree of touch and 
interaction with the deceased.9 Hospitals failing to follow infection 
control procedures, use standard barrier precautions, and employ 
sufficient, informed, or qualified staff contribute further to EVD’s 
spread.10 Although the rate of new EVD cases reported to the World 
Health Organization (WHO) appears to be waning, 22,092 confirmed, 
probable, and suspected cases of Ebola have been reported as of January 
25, 2015, and 8,810 deaths globally.11 
As noted by CDC Director Dr. Thomas Frieden, “[w]e live in a 
world where we are all connected by the air we breathe, the water we 
drink, the food we eat, and by airplanes that can bring disease from 
anywhere to anywhere in a day.”12 Although EVD has particularly 
frightening symptoms and a high mortality rate, its containment and 
treatment implicate similar legal, practical and operational issues as other 
communicable diseases. This article analyzes actual and potential legal 
                                                                                                             
6 Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) Information for Clinicians in U.S. Healthcare Settings, 
CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/preparing/clinicians.html (last updated 
Mar. 16, 2015). 
7 Clark, supra note 5, at 21 (“Subsequent outbreaks have also been associated with 
forested backwaters and have quickly burned themselves out. That is, until the current 
outbreak in West Africa”). 
8 Id. 
9 Scott F. Dowell et al., Transmission of Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever: A Study of Risk 
Factors in Family Members, Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1995, 179 J. 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES, Supp. 1, 1999, at S87, S90. 
10 Alexander et al, supra note 4; Barbara Kerstiëns & Francine Matthys, Interventions 
to Control Virus Transmission During an Outbreak of Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever: 
Experience from Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1995, 179 J. INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES, Supp. 1, 1999, at S263, S264-65; J.J. Muyembe-Tamfum et al., Ebola 
Outbreak in Kikwit, Democratic Republic of Congo: Discovery and Control Measures, 
179 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES, Supp. 1, 1999, at S259, S260. 
11 Update: Ebola Virus Disease Epidemic—West Africa, January 2015¸ 64 CDC 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 109, 109 (2015). Sierra Leone, Liberia, and 
Guinea had the most cases, with 7,968, 3,138, and 2,569 EVD patients, respectively. Id. 
For the week ending January 24, 2015, an average of eleven daily confirmed cases were 
reported from Sierra Leone, less than one from Liberia, and three from Guinea. Id. 
12 CDC Director Thomas Frieden, Press Conference on the First Ebola Case Diagnosed 
in the United States (Sept. 30, 2014) (transcript and audio available at http://www.cdc.
gov/media/releases/2014/t0930-ebola-confirmed-case.html); see also Press Release, 
CDC, CDC Announces First Case of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 
Infection (MERS) in the United States (May 2, 2014), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
media/releases/2014/p0502-US-MERS.html. 
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issues arising during epidemics or other public health emergencies, 
specifically focusing on Emory’s legal and operational preparedness 
experiences during the 2014 Ebola crisis. Hospitals, physicians, nurses, 
and public health officials can learn from that experience in developing 
their own response plans for a future similar crisis. 
II.  LEGAL ISSUES ARISING FROM EBOLA AND OTHER PUBLIC 
HEALTH EMERGENCIES 
A. Emergency Public Health Legal Authorities in Response to 
Ebola 
Law is a cornerstone of public health emergency preparedness, 
funding, and response to emerging threats like Ebola. In December 2014, 
Congress approved $5.4 billion to address the Ebola outbreak globally, 
including specific earmarks to the National Institutes of Health, the CDC, 
and others.13 Routine public health powers authorized by law may be 
used successfully to address emerging infectious disease threats. 
However, threats like EVD raise the possibility of invoking emergency 
powers to respond more rapidly in coordinated ways. Formal emergency 
declarations can affect public health and medical responses by instantly 
altering the legal environment, depending, in part, on the type of 
emergency declared.14 In the U.S., federal and many state (as well as 
select local) governments may declare states of “emergency,” 
                                                                                                             
13 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, H.R. 83, 113th 
Cong. (2014); Press Release, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 35 U.S. Hospitals 
Designated as Ebola Treatment Centers (Dec. 2, 2014) (available at http://www.hhs.gov/
news/press/2014pres/12/20141202b.html ) (“Hospitals with Ebola treatment centers have 
been designated by state health officials to serve as treatment facilities for patients based 
on a collaborative decision with local health authorities and the hospital administration. 
Ebola treatment centers are staffed, equipped, and have been assessed to have current 
capabilities, training, and resources to provide complex treatments for Ebola patients 
while minimizing risk to [HCWs].”). In particular, the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (“DARPA”), the Pentagon’s elite research arm, awarded Emory 
University up to $10.8M over three years to direct a project using the blood from 
survivors of EVD to test a novel way of treating infectious diseases, including not only 
EVD but potentially seasonal flu and malaria. Julie Steenhuysen, Blood from Ebola 
Survivors Could Help Spur New Disease Treatments, REUTERS (Feb. 4, 2015, 2:45 PM), 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/02/04/health-ebola-antibodies-
idINKBN0L80PP20150204. 
14 James G. Hodge, Jr. & Evan D. Anderson, Principles and Practice of Legal Triage 
During Public Health Emergencies, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 249, 250 (2009). 
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“disaster,”15 or “public health emergency,”16 among other classifications. 
These declarations may empower public and private entities to address 
public health crises like EVD by: 
• Offering public and private sectors greater 
flexibility to act to protect the public’s health through 
testing, screening, treatment, and vaccination programs; 
• Authorizing use of social distancing measures to 
control the spread of infectious conditions; 
• Allowing temporary suspensions of regulations 
that may impede emergency responses; 
• Enabling efforts among volunteer health 
providers through limits of, or protections from, claims 
of liability;17 
• Facilitating transitions to what the U.S. Institute 
of Medicine defines as “crisis standards of care” 
(discussed below);18 and 
• Altering medical licensing standards and scopes 
of practice to facilitate emergency responses.19 
Although states of emergency can further public health preparedness, 
their invocation is unpredictable and precarious. In response to the threat 
of EVD in 2014, neither the President nor the federal Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS) declared any major states of 
                                                                                                             
15 Evan D. Anderson & James G. Hodge, Emergency Legal Preparedness Among 
Select U.S. Local Governments, 3 DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS. S176, 
S176 (Supp. 2 2009). 
16 DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EMERGENCY SYSTEM FOR ADVANCE 
REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTEER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS (ESAR-VHP)—LEGAL AND 
REGULATORY ISSUES 10–11 (2006). 
17 Sharona Hoffman et al., Law, Liability, and Public Health Emergencies, 3 DISASTER 
MED. & PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 117, 123 (2009); Sara Rosenbaum et al., State Laws 
Extending Comprehensive Legal Liability Protections for Professional Health-Care 
Volunteers During Public Health Emergencies, 123 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 238, 238–41 
(2008). 
18 HEALTH SYS. RESEARCH, INC., ALTERED STANDARDS OF CARE IN MASS CASUALTY 
EVENTS: BIOTERRORISM AND OTHER PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES, AGENCY FOR 
HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY PUBL’N NO. 05-0043 (2005). 
19 James G. Hodge Jr. et al., Emergency Legal Preparedness for Hospitals and Health 
Care Personnel, 3 DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS S37, S39 (Supp. 1 
2009). 
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emergency.20 DHHS’ Secretary Sylvia Burwell did issue a limited 
declaration on December 9, 201421 to support EVD vaccine development 
under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act.22 
Among states, only Connecticut’s Governor issued a state of public 
health emergency, which was declared on October 6, 2014.23 
Governments’ reticence to declare formal states of emergency in 
response to EVD may seem incredulous given the national attention in 
the fall of 2014 and Americans’ perception of the risks. However, the 
lack of emergency declarations is understandable for several reasons. 
First, public health emergency declarations are typically issued in 
response to known or imminent threats of substantial harms to the 
population. A handful of domestic cases of a non-airborne, slowly-
spreading condition like EVD may frighten the general public, but it does 
not constitute an imminent threat to the public’s health. Second, neither 
DHHS nor most states had to issue any declaration to apply existing 
public health powers (e.g., education, testing, screening, treatment, 
quarantine, isolation, closures) to address EVD. Finally, while 
emergency laws can help mobilize efforts, they do not provide precise 
legal guidance. Framed in broad statutory or regulatory language, these 
laws offer more so a menu of legal powers and options rather than a 
definitive guide for action. Implementation of emergency powers may be 
one route to effective response efforts, but are not by definition a 
panacea. In reality, national, state, and local actors like Emory University 
Hospital must prioritize legal issues and generate practical solutions in 
real time to facilitate legitimate public health efforts designed to limit the 
spread of EVD in balance with communal and individual interests. 
B. Isolation and Quarantine 
Public health powers to issue quarantine or isolation orders for 
infectious diseases like EVD are politically controversial and often 
                                                                                                             
20 Press Secretary Josh Earnest, Press Briefing in the James S. Brady Press Briefing 
Room (Oct. 16, 2014) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/10/16/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-10162014) (stating 
President Obama is not “actively considering [a national health emergency] right now”). 
21 Press Release, Sylvia M. Burwell, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Sec’y 
Burwell Issues Declaration Under PREP Act to Support Dev. of Ebola Vaccines (Dec. 9, 
2014), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2014pres/12/20141209a.html. 
22 Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act, Pub. L. No. 109-148 
(codified in Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d, 247d-6e). 
23 Letter from Daniel P. Malloy, Governor, State of Conn., to the Honorable Denise 
Merill, Sec’y of the State, and Clerks of the General Assembly (Oct. 7. 2014), 
http://www.governor.ct.gov/malloy/lib/malloy/2014.10.07_Declaration_of_Public_
Health_Emergency.pdf. 
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misunderstood.24 Quarantine is designed to separate and restrict the 
movement of persons suspected or known to be exposed to an infectious 
disease.25 Isolation, on the other hand, separates persons who are 
suspected or known to be infected with an infectious disease.26 The 
powers to issue and enforce quarantine and isolation orders are primarily 
vested in state and local public health agencies.27 At the federal level, the 
Public Health Service Act affords the Secretary of DHHS the power to 
restrict movement of persons with specific infectious diseases, including 
EVD, into and throughout the United States.28 Authority to carry out 
these functions at the federal level is delegated to CDC.29 CDC can 
quarantine or isolate persons travelling to the U.S. or across state lines. 
However, it does not typically exercise these powers.30 Variations among 
federal and state law in how and when to implement emergency powers 
can lead to confusion, especially during exigencies.31 
Implementation of isolation and quarantine orders entails significant 
due process protections, including adequate evidentiary proof (often 
grounded in clear and convincing evidence),32 sufficient notice, right to a 
hearing and counsel, and assurances that medical and other needs of 
affected persons are met.33 Social distancing measures, including 
quarantine and isolation, were necessitated by the lack of 
pharmaceuticals in West Africa, although their effectiveness in 
                                                                                                             
24 JAMES G. HODGE, JR., PUBLIC HEALTH LAW IN A NUTSHELL 93–94 (2013). 
25 Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/
quarantine/aboutLawsRegulationsQuarantineIsolation.html (last updated Oct. 8, 2014) 
(emphasis added). 
26 HODGE, JR., supra note 24, at 94 (2013) (emphasis added). 
27 Id. at 93-94; see also State Quarantine and Isolation Statutes, NAT’L CONF. OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-
quarantine-and-isolation-statutes.aspx. 
28 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2012). 
29 Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/
quarantine/aboutLawsRegulationsQuarantineIsolation.html (last updated Oct. 8, 2014). 
30 Id. 
31 Jim Kuhnhenn, Where’s Czar? Ebola Raises Management Questions, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Oct. 28, 2014, 5:48 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/
c736c4d56e30479d877e79e7cf87e3e7/wheres-czar-ebola-raises-management-questions. 
32 Christine M. Grant & Patricia I. Elliott, 21st-Century Scientific Evidence Issues in 
Public Health Quarantines and Takings, in SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE REVIEW: CURRENT 
ISSUES AT THE CROSSROADS OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW, MONOGRAPH NO. 7 
127, 133 (Christine M. Grant & Helen E. Witt eds. 2006) (“State courts traditionally have 
given great deference to public health authorities requesting orders of quarantine. 
However, the claim of authority is not absolute—it can be refuted with facts . . . .Civil 
confinement usually requires clear and convincing evidence of the need for quarantine, 
coupled with supervised detention.”). 
33 Lawrence O. Gostin, James G. Hodge, Jr. & Scott Burris, Is the United States 
Prepared for Ebola?, 312 JAMA 2497, 2498 (2014). 
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combatting EVD varied.34 Because symptoms may not appear for up to 
twenty-one days after first exposure,35 quarantine measures in response 
to EVD have a finite end point. However, EVD social distancing 
measures must be stringently enforced to prove effective because of the 
high morbidity and mortality rates associated with the disease. 
Use of social distancing powers is controversial due to the direct 
infringement on individual liberty and autonomy, among other interests. 
Quarantine orders, based on potential exposure to infectious conditions 
like EVD, are especially contentious. Mandatory enforcement can 
negatively impact quarantined individuals (as was the case with those 
potentially exposed to Thomas Eric Duncan)36 and contribute to 
compliance failures. 
In October 2014, Maine nurse Kaci Hickox garnered significant 
media attention when she resisted a quarantine order upon returning to 
the U.S. from treating EVD patients in Sierra Leone.37 Hickox only 
exhibited a minor fever when arriving at Newark Liberty International 
Airport.38 However, Governors Andrew Cuomo (New York) and Chris 
Christie (New Jersey) implemented an automatic quarantine for any 
health care worker (“HCW”) returning from West Africa who had come 
in contact with EVD patients (exceeding CDC recommended guidance). 
Governor Christie worked with state public health agents to place Hickox 
in a mandatory quarantine setting outside a Newark hospital.39 After 
three days, New Jersey reversed the mandatory quarantine and Hickox 
returned to her home in Maine, where she faced another court ordered 
quarantine.40 Still presenting no outward symptoms, Hickox resisted the 
order,41 arguing that the automatic quarantines unconstitutionally 
                                                                                                             
34 Abhishek Pandey et al., Strategies for Containing Ebola in West Africa, 346 SCI. 
991, 992 (2014). 
35 Ebola Virus Disease, Signs and Symptoms, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/Ebola/
symptoms/index.html (last updated Nov. 2, 2014). 
36 After Thomas Eric Duncan’s death in Dallas, Texas, his contacts were subject to a 
mandatory quarantine. While none of the contacts actually became infected, many were 
stigmatized or unable to return to work or school. Kevin Sack et al., Life in Quarantine: 
21 Days of Fear and Loathing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2014, at A1. 
37 Jess Bidgood & Dave Philipps, Judge in Maine Eases Restrictions on Nurse, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2014, at A18. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Temporary Order, Mayhew v. Hickox, No. CV-2014-36 (Me. Dist. Ct. Oct. 30, 
2014). 
41 In view of the media and trailed by a police car, Hickox went for a bike ride with her 
boyfriend to publicly defy the quarantine order. Sydney Lupkin & Aaron Katersky, Talks 
with Ebola Nurse Kaci Hickox Fail, Governor to Use ‘Full Authority’, ABC NEWS (Oct. 
30, 2014, 10:13 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/talks-ebola-nurse-kaci-hickox-fail-
governor-full/story?id=26569596. 
350 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:341 
 
infringed on her liberty interests and discouraged HCWs from providing 
aid in EVD affected countries.42 State officials in Maine defended the 
quarantine as a public health necessity43 authorized by its quarantine 
law.44 When challenged, the Maine District Court relaxed the court 
order, allowing Hickox to move about freely, submit to self-monitoring, 
and report any upcoming travel.45 Ultimately, Hickox never contracted 
EVD. Her case illustrates the potential pitfalls and inconsistencies related 
to quarantine and isolation powers or other social distancing measures. 
C. Travel Restrictions 
Like social distancing measures, government restrictions on 
individual travel and movement implicate fundamental liberties. Yet 
these powers are vital to maintaining the public’s health and often 
explicitly authorized by law.46 Travel restrictions and screening are 
exercised at the federal and state levels. Federal regulations may limit 
persons with EVD from traveling between states.47 States may also have 
their own authority to restrict one’s travel within and outside its borders 
for public health purposes.48 Furthermore, federal oversight of passport 
approval,49 immigration law,50 transportation regulations,51 and “Do Not 
Board” requirements52 may restrict the entry or exit of persons into and 
out of the U.S. 
Federal powers to restrict travel are broad, but federal officials have 
been reluctant to completely prohibit travel to and from the affected 
EVD regions. WHO has consistently recommended against closing 
borders in response to EVD, in part because border closures make it 
“difficult to transport supplies, personnel, and other resources.”53 Some 
                                                                                                             
42 Bidgood & Philipps, supra note 37, at A18. 
43 Id. 
44 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 810 (2004). 
45 Order Pending Hearing, Mayhew v. Hickox, No. CV-2014-36 (Me. Dist. Ct. Oct. 
31, 2014). 
46 HODGE, JR., supra note 24, at 48. 
47 42 C.F.R. § 70.3 (2014). 
48 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 30.410 (2012). 
49 22 U.S.C. § 211a (2012). 
50 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
51 14 C.F.R. § 382.21 (2014). 
52 Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes—United States, June 
2007-May 2008, 57 CDC MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1009, 1009–12 (2008). 
53 WHO Urges Countries to Avoid Actions that Compromise Ebola Response Efforts, 
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.afro.who.int/en/media-centre/
pressreleases/item/6929-who-urges-countries-to-avoid-actions-that-compromise-ebola-
response-efforts.html. 
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members of Congress54 called for President Obama to close the U.S. 
border to West African nations, but he repeatedly refused.55 CDC 
Director Dr. Thomas Frieden warned that border closures have the 
potential to drive Ebola cases underground, causing the outbreak to 
spread undetected and continue indefinitely.56 CDC has warned 
Americans to avoid nonessential travel to Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra 
Leone,57 but does not limit the provision of resources to those countries. 
Rather than instituting mandatory travel restrictions in response to 
EVD (as some countries have required), U.S. authorities have opted for 
tighter screening protocols intended to prevent disease spread and allow 
aid to continue to reach the affected countries. On October 8, 2014, CDC 
announced enhanced screening measures at five U.S. airports to detect, 
assess, and respond to potential Ebola cases.58 Additionally, CDC issued 
recommended guidance regarding the screening and monitoring of 
persons with potential Ebola exposure.59 However, states are not required 
to follow CDC’s guidance. Accordingly, many opted to enforce their 
own more or less restrictive protocols.60 Other institutions may also opt 
(as Emory did) to implement their own guidelines accounting for specific 
                                                                                                             
54 See Steven Nelson, Congressman: Close Border to Ebola Countries, US NEWS (July 
30, 2014, 11:52 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/07/30/congressman-
close-border-to-ebola-countries; Sarah Ferris, Dems Call for Ebola Flight Ban, THE HILL 
(Oct. 9, 2014, 4:03 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/220317-dems-call-for-
obama-to-ban-flights-from-ebola-countries; Arlette Saenz & John Parkinson, 4 Things 
Some DC Lawmakers Want Obama to Do About Ebola, ABC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2014, 12:02 
PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/10/4-things-some-dc-lawmakers-want-
obama-to-do-about-ebola/. 
55 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President After Meeting on Ebola (Oct. 6, 
2014) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/10/06/
remarks-president-after-meeting-ebola) (“Because of the measures that we’ve put in 
place, as well as our world-class health system and the nature of the Ebola virus itself -- 
which is difficult to transmit—the chance of an Ebola outbreak in the United States is 
extremely low.”). 
56 Tom Frieden, CDC Chief: Why I Don’t Support a Travel Ban to Combat Ebola 
Outbreak, FOX NEWS (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2014/10/09/cdc-
chief-why-dont-support-travel-ban-to-combat-ebola-outbreak/. 
57 Travel Health Notices, CDC, http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/notices (last updated Mar. 
6, 2015). 
58 Press Release, CDC, Enhanced Ebola Screening to Start at Five U.S. Airports and 
New Tracking Program for all People Entering U.S. From Ebola-affected Countries (Oct. 
8, 2014) (available at http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2014/p1008-ebola-screening.
html) (describing enhanced screening at airports in New York, NY, Washington, DC, 
Newark, NJ, Chicago, IL, and Atlanta, GA). 
59 Interim U.S. Guidance for Monitoring and Movement of Persons with Potential 
Ebola Virus Exposure, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/exposure/monitoring-and-
movement-of-persons-with-exposure.html (last updated Dec. 24, 2014). 
60 State Ebola Protocols, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/phlp/publications/topic/ebola.html 
(last updated Mar. 9, 2015). 
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workplace-related factors (e.g., students, faculty, researchers and other 
non-HCW employees).61 
D. Duty to Treat 
Do physicians and other medical professionals have a duty to treat 
patients with highly infectious and dangerous diseases? What rights of 
employees to safety or other concerns must be considered in deciding to 
accept and treat a patient with a dangerous disease? Does a safety 
concern of a HCW ever outweigh any obligation to treat a patient? 
Emory’s team of physicians, nurses, lab technologists, chaplains, and 
others enthusiastically expressed willingness to accept and treat U.S.-
bound patients with EVD as reflected in the comments provided by Dr. 
Kent Brantly during a press conference on the day of his discharge with 
the entire Emory care team present on stage.62 Although Emory Hospital 
never faced the issue of having a physician or employee refuse to treat a 
highly infectious patient, HCWs’ resistance to treat highly infectious 
patients could be a critical factor in other cases, especially in facilities 
lacking personnel who are prepared to handle patients with diseases like 
EVD.63 
In Bragdon v. Abbot,64 the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that a 
medical professional may not categorically refuse to treat disabled 
patients (as defined in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(ADA)) for discriminatory reasons. Notwithstanding ethical principles,65 
medical professionals can refuse to treat patients in a number of 
circumstances as a general rule under common law.66 In Childs v. Weis,67 
                                                                                                             
61 Guidelines for Travel to Countries Affected by Ebola Virus Disease, EMORY UNIV. 
(Nov. 7, 2014), http://global.emory.edu/support/travel/ebola_travel_policy.html. 
62 Dr. Kent Brantly, Press Conference Announcing Discharge of Dr. Kent Brantly & 
Nancy Writebol (Aug. 21, 2014) (video available at http://www.wsbtv.com/news/news/
ebola-patients-released-emory-university-hospital/ng6jR/) [hereinafter Emory August 21 
Press Conference]. 
63 See Manny Fernandez, Dallas Nurse Contracts Ebola Virus, Elevating Response 
and Anxiety¸ N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2014, at A1. 
64 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
65 While the law may impose no, or a limited, duty on physicians to treat patients with 
AIDS and other infectious diseases, physicians’ moral and ethical obligations are more 
well-established. Ann Bitton Gazvy & James V. Hertzel, To Treat or Not to Treat: 
Healthcare Providers’ Duties, 126 N.J. Law., Feb. 1989, at 52. 
66 See, e.g., Anderson v. Houser, 523 S.E.2d 342 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); see also Polly J. 
Price, Ebola and the Law in the United States: A Short Guide to Public Health Authority 
and Practical Limits 17 (Emory Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-299), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2538187; Christopher C. White, 
Health Care Professionals and Treatment of HIV-Positive Patients: Is There an 
Affirmative Duty to Treat Under Common Law, the Rehabilitation Act, or the Americans 
with Disabilities Act?, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 67, 77 (1999). 
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a lower court expressed this “no duty” rule.68 Since the physician/patient 
relationship is essentially contractual in nature and no obligation to treat 
arises until its creation,69 medical professionals can terminate an existing 
physician/patient relationship with proper notice and transition to an 
alternative provider.70 However, refusal to treat can result in professional 
sanctions by the governing licensing boards in a particular state.71 
Even if EVD patients are likely considered disabled under the ADA, 
a physician can defend a decision to deny treatment if the patient 
presents a significant risk to the physician’s health.72 The ADA does not 
require that a person benefit from services where such individual poses a 
“direct threat” to the health or safety of others, meaning a significant risk 
to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a 
modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of 
auxiliary aids or services.”73 There is no standard definition of 
“significant risk”, as each situation must be determined on a case-by-case 
basis balancing objective and prevailing medical standards and science 
with a physician’s judgment. 
In Bragdon, the Supreme Court noted “the importance of prohibiting 
discrimination against persons with a recognized disability while 
protecting others from significant health and safety risks, resulting, for 
instance, from a contagious disease.”74 A physician’s belief, even in 
good faith, that a significant risk existed to his or her health would not 
necessarily provide relief from liability under the ADA. However, in the 
event of a new, unknown pathogen that lacks medical objectives or 
scientific information regarding transmission risks, a physician or other 
                                                                                                             
67 Childs v. Weis, 440 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. App. 1969). 
68 Id. at 107 (“Since it is unquestionably the law that the relationship of physician and 
patient is dependent on contract, either express or implied, a physician is not . . . liable for 
arbitrarily refusing to respond to a call of a person even urgently in need of medical or 
surgical assistance provided that the relation of physician and patient does not 
exist . . . .”). 
69 White, supra note 66, at 78. 
70 Termination of the physician/patient relationship must be carefully and 
appropriately accomplished with adequate notice to avoid claims of patient abandonment. 
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS 261, OP. 8.115—
TERMINATION OF THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP (2008); Can My Physician 
Terminate My Care or Discontinue Seeing Me?, GA. COMPOSITE MED. BD., 
http://medicalboard.georgia.gov/can-my-physician-terminate-my-care-or-discontinue-
seeing-me (last visited Mar. 22, 2015). 
71 Price, supra note 66, at 17-18; White, supra note 66, at 93 n.173. 
72 Ariel R. Schwartz, Note, Doubtful Duty: Physicians’ Legal Obligation to Treat 
During an Epidemic, 60 STAN. L. REV. 657, 671 (2007). 
73 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (2012); Schwartz, supra note 72, at 671. 
74 See Schwartz, supra note 72, at 671 (citing Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 649; Sch. Bd. of 
Nassau Cty. v Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987)). 
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health provider might legitimately posit that there is a “significant risk” 
outweighing any obligation to treat under the ADA or other ethical and 
moral principles. 
E. Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 
One exception to the general “no duty to treat” principle discussed 
above is a provider’s obligation to treat and stabilize patients in 
emergency settings. If a patient presents in a hospital emergency room 
(ER), this assessment, treatment, and stabilization requirement is well-
established under the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active 
Labor Act (EMTALA).75 EMTALA requires hospitals that receive 
federal funds (through Medicare and Medicaid) to provide stabilizing 
treatment to patients presenting with emergency conditions in the ER 
without regard for the patient’s ability to pay. Once the patient is stable, 
they may be appropriately admitted or transferred for further care. 
EMTALA focuses solely on the hospital’s obligations to assess 
whether an “emergency” exists (e.g., childbirth is considered an 
emergency) and, if so, provide stabilizing care and treatment.76 As a 
result, hospitals must treat patients with highly infectious and 
communicable diseases if the conditions are deemed to be an emergency 
(such as EVD). Absent an EMTALA waiver pursuant to a federally-
declared emergency, EMTALA requires stabilizing treatment even in the 
face of potential threats to the health and safety of HCWs. Separate 
federal standards under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 
discussed below, may also apply. 
EMTALA obligations extend to physicians by way of (1) 
employment of physicians by the hospital or health system, (2) a contract 
between a physician and a hospital under which the physician agrees to 
provide ER services, or (3) in the context of many community hospitals, 
by the physician’s staff privileges. For example, as noted by Ariel 
Schwartz, “if an on-call physician negligently acts inconsistent with the 
hospitals’ EMTALA obligations,”77 or violates hospital medical staff 
bylaws, the physician and the hospital may face liability under EMTALA 
and up to a $50,000 penalty. Additionally, the physician may be liable 
via contract, which may include possible expulsion from the medical 
staff pursuant to medical staff bylaws.78 
Hospitals have limited flexibility in how they satisfy their EMTALA 
obligations during emergencies. DHHS’ policies may allow hospitals to 
                                                                                                             
75 42. U.S.C. §§ 1395dd(a)–(b) (2012). 
76 Id. 
77 Schwartz, supra note 72, at 679. 
78 § 1395dd(d)(1); Schwartz, supra note 72, at 679. 
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avoid EMTALA sanctions for direction, relocation, or transfer of patients 
prior to screening or stabilization in limited circumstances pursuant to a 
Section 1135 waiver.79 Hospitals can also transfer patients in non-
emergency situations. The federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) issued the following guidelines in 2002: 
CMS does not require that a hospital’s medical staff 
provide on-call coverage 24 hours/day, 365 days/year. If 
there comes a particular time that a hospital does not 
have on-call coverage for a particular specialty, that 
hospital lacks capacity to treat a patient needing that 
specialty service and it is therefore appropriate to 
transfer the patient because the medical benefits of the 
transfer outweighs the risks . . . Medicare does not set 
requirements on how frequently a hospital’s medical 
staff of on-call physicians is expected to provide on-call 
coverage . . . .We are also aware that there are some 
hospitals that have limited financial means to maintain 
on call coverage all of the time . . . CMS allows 
hospitals flexibility to comply with EMTALA 
obligations by maintaining a level of on-call overage that 
is within their capability.80 
In many cases, patients may present in a non-emergent state or in 
settings other than a hospital ER, such as an outpatient physician clinic. 
Even though EMTALA is not implicated, providers should have clear 
protocols in place, including: (1) questions used to screen patients 
concerning potential exposure; (2) isolation of patients if answers to the 
screening questions are positive; (3) procedures for testing for EVD (or 
other communicable diseases); (4) transfer protocols, agreements to 
transfer to the hospital ER, or procedures for admission to the hospital; 
and (5) if there is no specialized service in the facility, a transfer to a 
facility that can treat the patient. 
                                                                                                             
79 Public Health Emergency Declaration Q&As, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/legal/Pages/phe-qa.aspx (last updated Apr. 24, 2013). 
80 Schwartz, supra note 72, at 680 (citing Memorandum from Dir., Survey & 
Certification Group., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Associate Reg’l Adm’rs 2 
(June 13, 2002), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/SurveyCertificationGenInfo/
downloads/SCLetter02-34.pdf). 
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F. Right to a Safe Working Environment, Workers’ 
Compensation, and the Family Medical Leave Act 
Related to, and balanced with, the duty to treat is the right of 
employees in the workplace to a safe working environment mandated by 
OSHA.81 After the initial decision was made to accept the first two 
patients, Emory’s next and equally important question was how to 
provide that care safely—both for the patients and for the HCWs on the 
care team. As part of Emory’s SCDU, the Environmental Health and 
Safety Officer was constantly present and led the OSHA response 
requirements and personal protective equipment (PPE) training with the 
HCWs. As discussed below, Emory’s adherence to clinical protocols and 
safety measures were critical both to successful treatment and to assuring 
employees of their own personal safety. 
Generally, employers have to provide a workplace free from 
“recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or 
serious physical harm” to employees.82 When dealing with a highly 
infectious disease like EVD, OSHA expects employers to develop a 
program based upon a “hazard assessment” of potential exposure at the 
worksite, including: (1) conducting employee awareness and other 
trainings regarding the potential hazard, (2) creating protocols and 
procedures requiring the issuance of PPE if necessary to prevent 
infection and transmission, (3) providing a means of reporting infection 
and medical surveillance for infected employees, (4) maintaining 
appropriate documentation of all of the foregoing, (5) preserving and 
maintaining patient medical records, and (6) appropriately recording with 
OSHA any occupationally-related infections.83 
Similarly, employees must comply with safety and health standards 
and regulations.84 Employees can refuse to work when there is a 
                                                                                                             
81 29 U.S.C. § 654 (2012); see also John B. Flood, Revisiting the Right to Refuse 
Hazardous Work Amidst the Anthrax Crisis of 2001, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 545, 567 
(2003); Refusing to Work Because Conditions are Dangerous, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & 
HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/as/opa/worker/refuse.html (last visited Mar. 22, 
2015) (public guidance issued by OSHA discussing an employee’s right to refuse work). 
82 29 U.S.C. § 654 (2012). 
83 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., OSHA 3122-06R, PRINCIPAL 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND PREPAREDNESS REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES (2004). 
84 29 U.S.C. § 143 (2012) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require an 
individual employee to render labor or service without his consent, nor shall anything in 
this chapter be construed to make the quitting of his labor by an individual employee an 
illegal act; nor shall any court issue any process to compel the performance by an 
individual employee of such labor or service, without his consent; nor shall the quitting 
of labor by an employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous 
conditions for work at the place of employment of such employee or employees be 
deemed a strike under this chapter.”). 
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reasonable apprehension of death or serious physical harm and no less 
drastic alternative is available.85 Related to significant health hazards that 
may result from treating EVD patients, employees could also refuse to 
work because they believe that their health is in imminent danger due to 
the actual presence or reasonable probability of the disease. Such 
employees are engaged in “protected activity” under the Act86 and thus 
not subject to adverse action by the employer for refusal to work unless 
the employer can establish through “objective” evidence that (1) there is 
no hazard or (2) its response plan will protect employees from exposure. 
Like any employer, hospitals must also address issues relating to the 
potential for workers’ compensation benefits and the applicability of the 
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).87 With respect to workers’ 
compensation benefits, in the event that an employee contracts EVD as a 
result of occupational exposure (in other words, the illness arises out of 
and in the course of employment as proven by the employee through 
competent medical evidence), the employee may be entitled to receive 
temporary total disability benefits in lieu of wages, reasonable and 
necessary medical treatment, and an award for any resulting permanent 
disability (e.g., reduced respiratory capacity). An employer should 
evaluate whether it has adequate worker’s compensation insurance 
coverage and coverage limits that include occupational diseases. 
If an employee contracts the disease and it is not occupationally 
related, the employee may be entitled to disability benefits if the 
employer provides such benefits. Again, the employer should carefully 
evaluate the extent of benefits and any exclusions. The employer must 
consider whether EVD is going to involve significant medical issues by 
determining (1) whether the employee is infectious; (2) what type of 
treatment is necessary; (3) whether the employee presents a health risk to 
others; and (4) when the employee can safely return to work.88 
Employers should also identify competent medical professionals with 
expertise in infection control that can advise on all medically related 
                                                                                                             
85 Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980); see also Stepp v. Review Bd. of the 
Indiana Emp’t Sec. Div., 521 N.E. 2d 350 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (employee who refused to 
perform tests on fluids with AIDS warning label was properly suspended and 
discharged); Marshall v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 618 F. 2d 1220, 1224 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(discharge of an employee in response to the employee’s good faith refusal to expose 
himself to conditions he reasonably believes are dangerous is discriminatory). 
86 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (2012); see also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, AUDIT REPORT NO. 05-97-
107-10-105, NATIONWIDE AUDIT OF OSHA’S SECTION 11(C) DISCRIMINATION 
INVESTIGATIONS (1997). 
87 29 U.S. C. § 2601 (2012); 29 C.F.R. pt. 825 (2014). 
88 Mark A. Lies II et al., Ebola and Employer Liability Issues, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP 
(Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.environmentalsafetyupdate.com/osha-compliance/ebola-and-
employer-liability-issues/. 
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issues, including worker’s compensation.89 Under the FMLA, eligible 
employees may be entitled to up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave if the 
employee or a spouse, child, or parent has a “serious health condition,” 
like EVD. This is especially important considering that both Emory and 
CDC issued guidelines mandating a twenty-one-day period of isolation 
for persons with EVD.90 
Emory carefully considered all of these laws in preparing for the 
arrival of its EVD patients. Providing a safe working environment was 
critical. Emory also determined that FMLA would be fully utilized if 
applicable and requested (which it was not). With respect to workers’ 
compensation benefits, Emory determined that any worker who 
contracted EVD would be entitled to workers’ compensation related to 
their medical expenses, time away from work, and post-traumatic 
syndrome disease at a rate of one-hundred percent (higher than the sixty-
six percent rate required in Georgia for disability91). Fortunately, this 
benefit was not utilized at Emory. With respect to a potential claim for 
“fear of contracting EVD,” such claims were to be adjudged ineligible 
for workers’ compensation unless the employee actually contracted the 
disease. This also was never an issue at Emory, but could be in a 
different setting and circumstances. 
G. HIPAA Privacy Rule and Other Issues of Confidentiality 
When treating patients with a highly infectious, lethal disease that is 
the subject of massive media attention, a paramount obligation is to 
maintain the confidentiality of patient information under federal and state 
law, including the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(“HIPAA”)92 and the accompanying Privacy Rule.93 Despite the fact that 
the identities and images of the patients treated at Emory (and indeed 
elsewhere nationally) were universally published, Emory patients were 
classified as “no information” patients, meaning that specifics of their 
condition, or even their identities, were carefully protected and managed 
in all public communications. In communications with the news media, 
                                                                                                             
89 Id. 
90 Interim U.S. Guidance for Monitoring and Movement of Persons with Potential 
Ebola Virus Exposure, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/exposure/monitoring-and-
movement-of-persons-with-exposure.html (last updated Dec. 24, 2014) [hereinafter CDC 
Guidelines]; John Fox, Bill Bornstein & Susan Grant, Emory Healthcare Ebola 
Preparedness Protocols, EMORY HEALTHCARE, http://www.emoryhealthcare.org/ebola-
protocol/ehc-message.hmtl (last visited Mar. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Emory Protocols]. 
91 Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-261 (2014) 
92 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 1938. 
93 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164.102-164.106, 164.500-164.534 (2014). 
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the Emory care team never used the patients’ names until Dr. Brantly’s 
news conference prior to his discharge from the Hospital. These actions 
appeared mysterious to the media, but Emory’s respect for confidential 
information was maintained throughout. In public communications, 
Emory’s team educated the media and the public on the disease itself, 
attempting to dispel fears, misunderstandings, and inaccuracies. 
Heightened risks to patient privacy and the need to control 
communications were recognized immediately at Emory. Its Chief 
Privacy Officer was one of the first administrative employees brought 
onto the team with other clinical care and operations personnel.94 Efforts 
to ensure HIPAA Privacy Rule compliance included several email 
“blasts” to all Emory healthcare employees reminding them of the 
obligations to ensure patient privacy, and warning about sharing any 
information even if no identifiable patient information was used. 
Employees were reminded not to talk about or discuss patient 
information in public areas (cafeterias, lobbies, etc.) and not to post 
anything about patients on any social media websites. Emory also 
activated an additional control on its electronic medical records system 
so workers who tried to access the EVD patients’ records were stopped 
by an electronic message asking the employees to affirmatively check a 
box attesting that they were authorized to view the information before 
the system permitted them to continue. Audit trials were conducted to see 
if anyone accessed the records without permission. Similar audits at the 
University of Nebraska’s Medical Center led to the discovery and 
termination of two workers who violated privacy requirements by 
reviewing information about one of the EVD patients treated there.95 
In November 2014, DHHS issued a special Bulletin specifically 
related to HIPAA Privacy in Emergency Situations in light of the EVD 
outbreak.96 DHHS sought to clarify that that while the protections of the 
Privacy Rule are not set aside in an emergency, there are “ways to ensure 
that appropriate uses and disclosures of the information still may be 
made when necessary to treat a patient, to protect the nation’s public 
health, and for other critical purposes.”97 
DHHS clarified that protected health information may be disclosed 
(1) to a public health authority; (2) at the direction of a public health 
                                                                                                             
94 Hospitals with Ebola Patients are Under Great Pressure to Ensure Their Privacy, 
14 REP. ON PATIENT PRIVACY, Nov. 2014, at 1, available at http://aishealth.com/sites/all/
files/marketplace_pdf_samples/samplerpp.pdf. 
95 Id. at 4. 
96 Memorandum from the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Bulletin: HIPAA Privacy 
in Emergency Situations (Nov. 2014) (available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/
hipaa/understanding/special/emergency/emergencysituations.pdf). 
97 Id. 
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authority or to a foreign government acting in collaboration with a public 
health authority; (3) to “persons at risk” of contracting or spreading the 
disease; (4) to family, friends and others “involved in an individual’s 
care and for notification;” (5) to anyone “as necessary to prevent or 
lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health and safety of a person 
or the public” consistent with applicable law; and (6) to the media or 
others not involved if the patient has not objected to or restricted the 
release of this information, or the patient is incapacitated and the 
disclosure is believed to be in the best interests of the patient and 
consistent with any prior expressed preferences of the patient.98 With 
respect to the permitted disclosure to the media, patient consent is key. 
Also, anyone disclosing patient information may only share the 
“minimum necessary” information to accomplish the purpose of 
disclosure.99 
H. Americans with Disabilities Act 
As hospitals decide whether to accept and treat patients with EVD or 
similar communicable diseases in the future,100 patient disability status 
will be an important consideration. Generally, persons with 
communicable or otherwise infectious diseases may satisfy the 
requirements of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehab 
Act),101 the ADA (involving health care and human service providers and 
institutions),102 and the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA),103 
and may therefore be protected against discriminatory acts, including the 
decision by a provider not to accept or treat a covered individual. These 
statutes all prohibit covered entities (such as hospitals) from 
discriminating against (i.e., refusing to treat) persons with disabilities in 
                                                                                                             
98 Id. 
99 Id. (“In general, . . . affirmative reporting to the media or the public at large about an 
identifiable patient, or the disclosure to the public or media of specific information about 
treatment of an identifiable patient, such as specific tests, test results or details of a 
patient’s illness, may not be done without the patient’s written authorization (or the 
written authorization of a personal representative who is a person legally authorized to 
make health care decisions for the patient). See 45 CFR 164.508 for the requirements for 
a HIPAA authorization.”). 
100 The decision to accept and treat these Ebola patients at Emory was clinically based, 
and therefore did not focus on legal analysis. Nevertheless, under different circumstances 
or with another disease, the issue may play a larger role in the decision process. 
101 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973) (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794). 
102 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012)). 
103 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122. Stat. 3553, 3553-54 
(2008). 
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providing benefits and services, or conducting programs and activities on 
the basis of their disability. This leads to the ultimate question of whether 
an infectious disease such as EVD is, in fact, a “disability.”104 
The Rehab Act (later incorporated into the ADA) protects 
individuals defined as potentially benefitting from rehabilitation 
services.105 Amendments in 1974 expanded the definition of 
“handicapped individuals” to include any person who (1) has a physical 
or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such 
person’s major life activities; (2) has a record of such an impairment; or 
(3) is regarded as having such as impairment.106 These definitional terms, 
including what constituted a “physical or mental impairment” are not 
defined by the Rehab Act107 and were subsequently refined by DHHS,108 
although DHHS unequivocally stated that the list was “not 
comprehensive” and that certain terms in the statute (i.e. whether the 
condition “substantially limits” a person’s major life activities) were not 
“capable of definition.”109 
What constitutes a handicap or a disability has been the subject of 
considerable litigation following the passage of the Rehab Act and its 
amendments, and particularly following the precedent-setting case of 
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline.110 In Arline, the Supreme 
Court held that an individual with a contagious disease (in this case, 
tuberculosis) is considered handicapped and thus entitled to protection 
under the Rehab Act. The Court’s ruling in Arline has played a pivotal 
role in the development of federal disability law, especially as applied to 
persons diagnosed and living with HIV and AIDS because of the 
communicable nature of HIV.111 
                                                                                                             
104 Office for Civil Rights, Your Rights Under Section 504 and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://archive.hhs.gov/ocr/504ada.
html (last visited Mar. 24, 2015). 
105 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973). 
106 Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-651, 89 Stat. 2–5 (1974) 
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 706, 780, 790 (1974)). 
107 Nor were definitional terms subsequently defined in the ADA in 1990. Further 
regulations provide guidance as to what constitutes a “physical or mental impairment” to 
include a “physiological disorder or condition” that affects “one or more of the following 
body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including 
speech organs,) cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, hemic and 
lymphatic, skin and endocrine.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2014). 
108 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 (2014). 
109 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 app. A. 
110 Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 482 U.S. 273 (1973). 
111 Donald H.J. Hermann, The Development of AIDS Federal Civil Rights Law: Anti-
Discrimination Law Protection of Persons Infected With Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus, 33 IND. L. REV. 783 (a comprehensive analysis and retrospective of the application 
of the public health laws and federal and state decisions relating to persons with HIV 
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Whether an individual infected with EVD or another highly 
infectious disease has a disability and therefore qualifies for protection 
under the ADA has not been settled or even addressed.112 It would 
appear that such an individual would satisfy the first two requirements of 
a “disability,” (1) having “a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities”, and (2) having a 
“record of such impairment,”113 but whether the third prong of that test 
(“regarded and treated as though they have an impairment”), is uncertain. 
Although the mortality rates of EVD have been enormously high in West 
Africa during the 2014 outbreak, all but one patient treated for EVD in 
the United States have survived and been declared free of the disease and 
not a threat to the public.114 
The ADA specifies that it does not apply to impairments that are 
“transitory and minor,” defining “transitory” as “an impairment with an 
actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.”115 While the life cycle 
of EVD appears to be less than six months (either ending in death or 
being declared disease-free), the long-term health effects on persons who 
are declared disease free are unknown and still undergoing scrutiny.116 
                                                                                                             
infection and AIDS); see Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 642 (a person with asymptomatic HIV is 
entitled to claim protection under the ADA since it constituted an “impairment” that 
substantially limits the “major life activity” of reproduction and therefore cannot be 
denied medical treatment. However, HIV is not always a per se disability under the 
ADA); see also Sussle v. Sirina Protection Sys. Corp., 267 F. Supp. 2d 285 (E.D.N. Y. 
2003) (although Hepatitis C is a “physical impairment” and thus a disability, plaintiff 
failed to demonstrate that the impairment substantially limited a major life activity). 
112 Schwartz, supra note 72, at 669. 
113 42. U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)-(B) (2012); see also The ADA: Questions and Answers, 
EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/adaqa1.
cfm (last visited Mar. 24, 2015) (“The first part of the definition makes clear that 
the ADA applies to persons who have substantial, as distinct from minor, impairments, 
and that these must be impairments that limit major life activities such as seeing, hearing, 
speaking, walking, breathing, performing manual tasks, learning, caring for oneself, and 
working. An individual with epilepsy, paralysis, a substantial hearing or visual 
impairment, mental retardation, or a learning disability would be covered, but an 
individual with a minor, non-chronic condition of short duration, such as a sprain, 
infection, or broken limb, generally would not be covered. The second part of the 
definition would include, for example, a person with a history of cancer that is currently 
in remission or a person with a history of mental illness. The third part of the definition 
protects individuals who are regarded and treated as though they have a substantially 
limiting disability, even though they may not have such an impairment.”). 
114 Bruce Ribner, Statement at News Conference (Aug. 21, 2014) (transcript available 
at http://news.emory.edu/stories/2014/08/ebola_press_conference_ribner_statement/
campus.html). 
115 42. U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B). 
116 Kelsey Ryan, Ebola Survivors Face Long Term Health Effects, THE WICHITA 
EAGLE, http://www.kansas.com/news/local/article3952318.html (last updated Nov. 15, 
2014, 11:21 AM). 
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For example, one long-term effect currently being researched is the 
medical condition of uveitis, an inflammation of the inner workings of 
the eye. Researchers previously found that survivors of a 1995 EVD 
outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo developed eye pain 
and vision problems after having the virus.117 Additionally, chronic 
arthralgia—pain in the joints—was also common in people living in 
Gabon with EVD antibodies present in their blood.118 Due to its potential 
long-term effects, EVD could potentially be defined as a medical 
condition that is not “transitory.” 
Assuming that the issue of transience is resolved, another issue is 
whether a person with EVD would be regarded as having an impairment 
or a substantially limiting disability, even though they may not actually 
have, or currently be suffering from, such an impairment. In its 
interpretation of this prong of the definitional test of a “disability,” the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission states that “this provision 
would protect a severely disfigured qualified individual from being 
denied employment because an employer feared the ‘negative reactions’ 
of others.”119 The fearful and negative public reaction to the EVD 
outbreak in the United States may have devastating effects even to third 
parties who themselves were not infected with EVD but who simply had 
contact with infected (though asymptomatic) patients.120 While important 
to consider, it is too early at this stage to predict the legal outcome if a 
patient who has been previously infected with EVD, survives, and then 
faces some sort of discriminatory action.121 
I. Crisis Standards of Care 
Crisis standards of care (CSC) substantially alter how health care 
facilities operate and deliver care as necessitated by widespread or 
catastrophic disaster.122 Operating under such standards shifts the focus 
                                                                                                             
117 Kapay Kibadi et al., Late Opthalmologic Manifestations in Survivors of the 1995 
Ebola Virus Epidemic in Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 179 J. INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES, Supp. 1, 1999, at S13, S13. 
118 Ryan, supra note 116. 
119 The ADA, supra note 113. 
120 See Erik Ortiz, Ohio Bridal Shop Visited by Ebola Nurse Amber Vinson Is Closing 
Down, (Jan. 9, 2015, 9:29 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ebola-virus-
outbreak/ohio-bridal-shop-visited-ebola-nurse-amber-vinson-closing-down-n282861. 
121 See Schwartz, supra note 72, for a comprehensive analysis of a physician’s duty to 
treat in an epidemic, focusing in particularly on SARS, HIV-AIDS, avian influenza, and 
Ebola. 
122 INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., GUIDANCE FOR ESTABLISHING CRISIS 
STANDARDS OF CARE FOR USE IN DISASTER SITUATIONS: A LETTER REP. 18 (Bruce M. 
Altevogt et al. eds., 2009), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=
12749&page=R1. 
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of care from the individual patient to the population.123 Normally, 
providing care at such a level potentiates legal claims against health care 
providers, but a formal declaration at the state level offers legal powers 
and protections for those providers.124 Caring for the few domestic EVD 
patients to date required efforts from hundreds of HCWs acting of their 
own volition and access to specialized isolation facilities and supplies.125 
Without an approved treatment for EVD, administration of readily 
available, routine medical treatments satisfies existing standards of 
care,126 even though some patients recovered after receiving 
experimental treatments such as ZMapp and Brincidofovir.127 In 2012, 
the Institute of Medicine described how scarcity of personnel, space, and 
medications when treating infectious diseases, like EVD, can necessitate 
shifts from conventional standards of care to CSC.128 Presently, the 
United States has the capacity to concurrently treat only a small number 
of EVD patients in specialized isolation facilities.129 A domestic EVD 
outbreak would likely spread resources thin, temporarily transforming 
                                                                                                             
123 COMMITTEE ON GUIDANCE FOR ESTABLISHING STANDARDS OF CARE FOR USE IN 
DISASTER SITUATIONS, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE: 
A SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK FOR CATASTROPHIC DISASTER RESPONSE 42 (2012), available at 
http://www.phe.gov/coi/Documents/Committee%20on%20Guidance%20for%20Est%20
SC%20for%20Use%20in%20Disaster%20Situations%20Atlanta%20Conf.pdf 
[hereinafter JOINT PREPAREDNESS CONFERENCE 2012]; INST. OF MED., CRISIS STANDARDS 
OF CARE: A SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK FOR CATASTROPHIC DISASTER RESPONSE 33 (Dan 
Hanfling et al. eds., 2012), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=
13351 [hereinafter Hanfling et al.] (While the focus under CSC becomes the needs of the 
population, the purpose of establishing these standards is to ensure that “the best possible 
care is given to individuals and the population as a whole”). 
124 JOINT PREPAREDNESS CONFERENCE 2012, supra note 123 (situational circumstances 
and a declaration from a state government indicating that CSC “will be in effect for a 
sustained period” offers health care providers additional legal protections in determining 
how to best allocate scarce resources.). 
125 James G. Hodge, Jr. et. al, Law and the Public’s Health: Law, Medicine, and Public 
Health Preparedness: The Case of Ebola, 130 PUB. HEALTH REP. 167, 167-68 (2015). 
126 Makikio Kitamura, U.S. Ebola Patient Brantly to Be Released From Hospital, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Aug. 31, 2014, 3:39 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2014-08-21/u-s-ebola-patient-brantly-to-be-released-from-hospital (Supportive care at 
specialized isolation facilities remains the standard treatment for EVD. This includes 
keeping the patient hydrated, replacing lost blood, and fighting opportunistic infections 
with antibiotics.). 
127 JAMES G. HODGE, JR., NETWORK PUB. HEALTH. L., EMERGENCY LEGAL 
PREPAREDNESS CONCERNING EBOLA: A PRIMER, (Dec. 1, 2014), available at 
https://www.networkforphl.org/_asset/dzf8u4/Ebola-Outbreak-2014---Network-
Overview.pdf. 
128 Hanfling et al., supra note 123. 
129 See US Has Capacity for 11 Ebola Patients at Specialized Hospitals, ABC NEWS 
(Oct. 16, 2014, 4:47 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/us-capacity-11-ebola-patients-
specialized-hospitals/story?id=26251721. 
2015] COMMUNICABLE DISEASE RESPONSE CONSIDERATIONS 365 
 
basic clinical standards of care.130 With changes to medical CSC comes a 
corresponding shift in legal standards of care and the potential for 
decreased risks of liability related to triaging public health and medical 
services.131 
J. General Principles of Potential Negligence Claims 
Liability risks pose ongoing concerns for HCWs and health care 
entities on the frontline of the EVD emergency responses as they attempt 
to navigate patient care.132 Liability may arise from a health care 
provider’s actions or even a failure to act. Medical malpractice and 
wrongful death claims may be brought if a physician fails to diagnose, or 
misdiagnoses, delays treatment, or uses unapproved treatments without 
first obtaining adequate consent.133 For instance, the initial handling of 
the EVD case of Thomas Eric Duncan134 in Dallas, Texas led to threats 
of litigation and a settlement after physicians failed to diagnose his EVD 
during his initial visit to the hospital emergency room.135 Health care 
entities may also be at an increased liability risk for failing to have 
proper emergency procedures in place for, or adequately training 
employees to handle, infectious diseases like EVD.136 
                                                                                                             
130 Hodge, Jr., et al, supra note 127, at 168. 
131 James G. Hodge, Jr., The Evolution of Law in Biopreparedness, 10 BIOSECURITY & 
BIOTERRORISM 38, 38–48 (2012); Hanfling et al., supra note 123 (legal standards of care 
are not required to change in conjunction with medical standards of care, but emergency 
planners should “consider whether additional liability protections are warranted in their 
jurisdictions”). 
132 Sharona Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility: Liability and Immunity in Public 
Health Emergencies, 96 GEO. L. J. 1913, 1918 (2008). 
133 Hodge Jr., et al, supra note 127, at 169. 
134 Greg Botelho, U.S. Ebola Patient: The Travels and Health Travails of Thomas Eric 
Duncan, CNN (Oct. 2, 2014, 9:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/01/health/us-ebola-
patient/ (Mr. Duncan was the first domestically diagnosed Ebola case. Texas Health 
Presbyterian Hospital Dallas, the hospital where he was eventually diagnosed and treated 
is not one of the four United States hospitals with specialized HCUs to isolate and treat 
patients with highly infectious and dangerous diseases). 
135 Justin Moyer, Dallas Hospital Settles With Family of Ebola Patient Thomas Eric 
Duncan, Disputes Media Accounts of His Treatment, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/11/13/dallas-hospital-
settles-with-family-of-ebola-patient-thomas-eric-duncan-disputes-media-accounts-of-his-
treatment/ (After an initial visit to the Dallas hospital, Duncan, who presented with a 
fever that spiked to 103 degrees Fahrenheit, was sent home with antibiotics despite CDC 
guidance to look for “for patients who had traveled to areas with “active” Ebola 
transmission and had temperatures above 101.5 degrees.”). 
136 Jeffery P. Clark et al., Ebola Preparedness: Mission Critical for Hospitals and 
Health Systems, REINHART (Oct. 21, 2014), available at http://www.reinhartlaw.com/
Documents/LE_20141021Revised-FINAL.pdf. 
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Implementing CSC in a hospital setting requires difficult decisions 
centered on testing, screening, and treatment.137 Using new or 
experimental drugs to treat patients further implicates liability risks. To 
obviate the potential for negligence claims, health care entities should 
ensure proper development, implementation, and testing of clinical 
protocols for diagnosing and treating infectious disease.138 Providing 
hospital employees with proper access to PPE and adequate training 
ensures all protocols are followed safely.139 As for patient treatment, 
health care providers should comply with appropriate standards of care, 
obtain proper patient consent, and seek FDA approval prior to 
administering any new or experimental treatment.140 As discussed 
throughout, Emory’s team was dedicated to careful and coordinated 
preparation, education of both its HCWs and other employees during the 
entire experience, constant refinement of clinical protocols,141 and 
promotion of a culture that is characterized as “patient and family 
centered.”142 
Health care providers do not have a comprehensive liability 
protection. However, state and federal governments offer a bevy of 
specific immunities, high burdens of proof for civil malpractice 
claims,143 and other protections144 from acts of negligence by HCWs and 
                                                                                                             
137 James G. Hodge, Jr., Gregory Measer & Asha M. Agrawal, “Top 10” Issues in 
Public Health Legal Preparedness and Ebola, ABA HEALTH ESOURCE, Nov. 2014, 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/aba_health_esource/2014-2015/
november/top10.html. 
138 Clark et al., supra note 136. 
139 Id.; Guidance on Personal Protective Equipment To Be Used by Healthcare 
Workers During Management of Patients with Ebola Virus Disease in U.S. Hospitals, 
Including Procedures for Putting On (Donning) and Removing (Doffing), CDC, 
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/ppe/guidance.html (last updated Feb. 12, 
2015). 
140 Hodge, Jr. et al, supra note 127, at 169; Elaine Schattner, Ebola, Experimental 
Drugs and Informed Consent: Should Those At Risk Simply Take What The 
Doctor Orders?, FORBES (Aug. 31, 2014, 8:03 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/elaineschattner/2014/08/31/ebola-experimental-drugs-and-
informed-consent-should-those-at-risk-simply-take-what-the-doctor-orders/. 
141 Lameiras, supra note 3, at 21, 23. 
142 EMORY HEALTHCARE, CARE OF THE PATIENT WITH EBOLA VIRUS DISEASE (2014), 
available at http://www.emoryhealthcare.org/ebola-protocol/pdf/overview-of-ebola.pdf. 
143 Jessica Dye, Ebola Lawsuits Would Face High Hurdles in Texas, REUTERS (Oct. 7, 
2014, 7:02 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/07/us-health-ebola-usa-liability-
idUSKCN0HW0W920141007. In Texas, a malpractice claim due to emergency room 
error requires plaintiffs show hospital staff were “willfully and wantonly negligent.” Id. 
In Duncan’s case, this would involve showing that “the staff had to have consciously put 
[the patient] or others at extreme risk by releasing him” instead of just showing a mistake 
was made. Id. 
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volunteers that supplement the hospital’s planning and preparations for 
insulating itself against liability.145 Other protections may shield against 
some negligence claims directed at hospitals or other select entities. For 
example, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, agreed to by 
all states, insulates public agents at the state or local level against 
liability claims.146 These protections apply typically only for a limited 
time, however, and may require emergency declarations to trigger their 
benefits.147 Moreover, they do not apply to liability claims based on 
gross negligence, willful or criminal acts, or potential failures to plan.148 
Concerning pharmaceutical companies, liability can arise in the 
manufacturing, testing, development, distribution, or administration of 
new drugs or vaccines, especially in real-time emergencies. However, 
these entities may be immunized from liability via the PREP Act.149 
DHHS Secretary Sylvia Burwell issued a PREP Act declaration on 
December 9, 2014, in support of the development of three different EVD 
vaccines to combat the EVD outbreak internationally and prevent a 
future domestic outbreak.150 
III. OPERATIONAL, CLINICAL, AND PRACTICAL ISSUES: EMORY’S 
EBOLA EXPERIENCE 
A. Hazardous Waste, Environmental Safety, and Transport 
and Disposal of Waste 
In preparing to receive Emory’s first two EVD patients, Dr. Gartland 
did not anticipate the significance of the Hospital’s proximity to CDC 
headquarters.151 CDC assumed responsibility for the ultimate disposal of 
the enormous amounts of hazardous waste generated in caring for the 
                                                                                                             
144 TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH (TFAH), TFAH LIABILITY PROTECTIONS RELEVANT 
STATUTES (2008), available at http://healthyamericans.org/reports/bioterror08/pdf/legal-
preparedness-law-review-of-state-statutes-and-codes.pdf. 
145 Rosenbaum et al., supra note 17, at 238-41. 
146 Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Pub. L. No. 104-321, 110 Stat. 3877 
(1996). 
147 HODGE, JR., supra note 24, at 244. 
148 See James G. Hodge, Jr. & Erin Fuse Brown, Assessing Liability for Health Care 
Entities That Insufficiently Prepare for Catastrophic Emergencies, 306 JAMA 308, 309 
(2011). 
149 Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 
119 Stat. 2818 (2005) (codified in Public Health Service Act at 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d, 
247d-6e). 
150 Burwell, supra note 21. 
151 Emory University Hospital is on the same side of Clifton Road in Atlanta as CDC 
headquarters, separated only by a few academic buildings owned by Emory University. 
368 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:341 
 
EVD patients. Emory Hospital’s close proximity “along” the street to 
CDC greatly facilitated compliance with U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT) Hazardous Materials Regulations152 for 
transporting hazardous waste.153 Because wastes from EVD patients are 
considered “hazardous material” under the DOT, they are subject to 
stringent procedures and regulations set forth by local, state, and federal 
agencies.154 Such wastes must be appropriately incinerated, autoclaved, 
or otherwise inactivated to prevent further potential for infection. Strict 
compliance with regulations is mandatory, even for “off-site” 
commercial transport (including final transport for disposal).155 
Due to EVD’s clinical pathway, Emory’s team prioritized waste 
disposal, but no one foresaw the need to properly dispose of nearly 40 
bags of waste per day for the two patients.156 Contracts were prepared 
with outside vendors and additional equipment was ordered and installed 
prior to the patients’ arrivals since existing equipment at the Hospital 
was insufficient to address the initial disposal needs of the SCDU and 
other units. As well, the Hospital arranged with CDC for the ultimate 
disposal of the waste. 
In the future, responding hospitals must be prepared to quickly 
address similar challenges to best ensure the safety of the patients, 
HCWs, and other staff. While another epidemic or public health 
emergency caused by a different pathogen may not present the same 
waste disposal challenges as EVD, health providers should have access 
to an expert in these issues or on staff. Advance contracts with medical 
                                                                                                             
152 49 C.F.R. pts. 171-180 (2014). 
153 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 (2014) (definition of “off-site” location for purposes of the 
hazardous waste regulations from the Department of Transportation); 40 C.F.R. 
§ 262.20(f) (An EPA hazardous waste manifest is not required when transporting 
hazardous waste across the street or along a street, provided your organization owns 
property along the road on which you are transporting it. However, if the waste is a DOT 
hazardous material, a DOT bill of lading is required whenever you are transporting 
hazardous materials in commerce. In the event of a discharge, the hazardous waste 
generator is required to comply with the requirements for transporters at 40 C.F.R. 
§ 263.30 (immediate action) and § 263.31 (discharge clean up)); see also On-Site and 
Off-Site Transportation of Hazardous Waste [40 CFR 260.10], ENVT’L RES. CTR. (May 
16, 2007), http://www.ercweb.com/resources/viewreg.aspx?id=6976. 
154 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030 (2014) (bloodborne pathogens standard); see, e.g., GA. COMP. 
R. & REGS. 391-3-4 (2005); GA. CODE ANN. §§12-8-20 (2004); Fact Sheet: Safe 
Handling, Treatment, Transport and Disposal of Ebola-Contaminated Waste, 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA_
FS-3766.pdf. [hereinafter OSHA Ebola Fact Sheet]. 
155 OSHA Ebola Fact Sheet, supra note 154. 
156 U.S. ARMY INST. OF PUBLIC HEALTH, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE EBOLA 
VIRUS DISEASE WASTE MANAGEMENT IN THE MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITY 13,18 
(2014), available at http://phc.amedd.army.mil/PHC%20Resource%20Library/
EVDWasteManagementonMTFSOP.docx. 
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waste vendors should be regularly reviewed to assure vendors are 
qualified to address pathogen-related waste disposal issues. Finally, 
developing relationships with local and state officials regarding waste 
disposal helps obviate misunderstandings and assures compliance with 
complex waste management regulations. 
B. Supply Chain and Vendor Agreements 
 
For Emory and other hospitals facing an infectious disease 
emergency, supply chain issues and availability of equipment and 
supplies are critical. For EVD patients, having a sufficient supply of 
personal protective equipment (PPE) is essential to effective treatment. 
Emory’s clinical protocols, noted below, required HCWs to don a new 
set of PPE every time they entered a patient’s room,157 resulting in large 
quantities of PPE being used daily. Hospitals must carefully review their 
vendor contracts and their capacity to ramp up deliveries for critical 
supplies without sudden price increases, substitutions, or special delivery 
fees. Resource alternatives should be prearranged in case the normal 
supply chain is interrupted or a vendor cannot meet demand. Inventoried 
supplies critical to EVD treatment (or any infectious disease during an 
emergency or epidemic) must be secured. In the event of a supply 
shortage, conservation and prioritization distribution plans should be 
developed. 
C. Clinical Protocols 
Guidelines for the care and treatment of patients with EVD continue 
to evolve as the science surrounding the disease progresses. Hospitals 
and health systems must remain up to date on real-time developments. 
Relevant CDC guidelines,158 for example, are comprehensive, accessible, 
and continually updated. Emory determined that “all of American health 
care needs some level of preparedness for Ebola and other types of 
communicable diseases . . . .”159 To this end, Emory developed its own 
clinical protocols, utilizing lessons learned from its own experience 
while incorporating guidelines issued by CDC and others “with the hope 
that [they] can help other health systems develop their own Ebola 
readiness plans.”160 
                                                                                                             
157 Emory Protocols, supra note 90. 
158 CDC Guidelines, supra note 90. 
159 Emory Protocols, supra note 90. 
160 Id. 
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D. Emory’s Care Transformation Model and Patient Centered 
Care 
To limit the number of individuals exposed to EVD at Emory, every 
HCW in direct contact with EVD patients was knowledgeable in how to 
handle patients’ every need—from drawing blood and taking vital signs 
to administering medications and cleaning up bodily fluids. Safety 
precautions involved in donning and doffing of PPE entailed almost 70 
total separate steps161 and considerable time. As a result, Emory’s care 
team determined that once a HCW entered a patient’s room, the worker 
would be physically present for the entire shift without exiting the room. 
This model of care demands a unique culture, one Emory began 
cultivating in 2007 when the current state of performance was assessed 
for safety, evidence-based decision-making, anticipation of needs, and 
teamwork among caregivers. Emory Hospital surveyed patient and 
family perceptions of their involvement in care decisions. As leaders and 
staff assessed the organizational culture and perception of care through 
directed focus groups, it became apparent that employees, patients, and 
families doubted the Hospital’s ability to meet the quality promise to 
patients of “impeccable clinical outcomes, delivered safely with 
outstanding service.”162 This assessment necessitated a “culture 
transformation”163 for Emory to meet its promise of quality care to 
patients centered on five essential attributes: (1) patient- and family-
centered care, (2) shared decision making, (3) cultural competency and 
diversity, (4) fair and just culture, and (5) transparency (see Figure 1. 






                                                                                                             
161 Emory Protocols, supra note 90 at Support Document 10: Standard Operating 
Procedures: SCDU. 
162 About Us, EMORY HEALTHCARE, http://www.emoryhealthcare.org/employment/
about-us.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2015). 
163 Interview by Jane E. Jordan with Susan M. Grant, Chief Nurse Exec. & Chief 
Patient Servs. Officer, Emory Healthcare (Feb. 1, 2015). 
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Figure 1. Care Transformation Model164 
 
The new culture, focused on the interests of the patient and his or her 
family, supported the EVD care team in its goal to put aside any egos 
and work together. For example, none of Emory’s physicians refused to 
take blood or clean up bodily waste. As two nurses stated, 
We had to be a family, we relied on each other to be 
safe . . . .There were no egos—there couldn’t be . . . .We 
all really worked and functioned as a team. It was truly 
collaborative, not just among the nurses, but the staff, 
the physicians, the lab . . . .We all had a lot on our 
minds, more than just what was happening in the 
isolation unit, so we had to take care of each other.165 
The Hospital also addressed emotional support for the care team. 
Chaplains were available at all times for team members. Daily “huddles” 
allowed members to share any mistakes witnessed and lessons learned 
during the day. While “soft” issues such as culture and emotional support 
                                                                                                             
164 Id. Patients and the “promise” of quality are seated on a platform of Patient- and 
Family-Centered Care, illustrating that patients are at the source of control. The attributes 
that staff and leadership identified that would transform the culture and care was placed 
on the platform: transparency, fair and just culture, cultural competence, shared decision-
making and patient- and family-centered care. Teamwork ribbons link the attributes. 
165 Lamerias, supra note 3, at 25 (quoting Sharon Vanairsdale, Clinical Nurse 
Specialist, and Carolyn Hill, Nursing Unit Director for the SCDU). 
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are often downplayed in preparing for an epidemic or public emergency, 
Emory’s success was tied to its appreciation of these issues. 
E. Team Preparedness and Drills 
Emory’s treatment of four EVD patients to date has been grounded 
in excellent clinical care, adherence to the highest levels of safety, 
appreciation of relevant legal principles, and its dedicated care team. The 
Hospital’s response was also positively impacted by twelve years of 
planning and practice, including biannual “preparedness” drills. In 
establishing its SDCU in 2002, Emory determined that it would also be 
prudent to establish an enterprise-wide program, known as the Office of 
Critical Event Preparedness and Response (CEPAR).166 CEPAR is 
dedicated to assuring coordinated emergency responses to diseases, 
natural disasters, or other emerging threats. Still, any facility treating 
patients with a communicable disease must “expect the unexpected.”167 
Preparedness requires comprehensive team readiness to address the non-
clinical issues that invariably arise. While the specific composition of 
this larger team depends on the circumstances, essential non-clinical 
competencies would likely include: 
• Public Relations/Communications/Crisis Management 
• Hospital Operations 
• Risk Management 
• Security/Facilities Management/Transportation 
• Environmental Safety 
• Compliance/Privacy 
• Legal 
• Customer Service/Patient Relations/Pastoral Care 
• Human Resources 
                                                                                                             
166 CEPAR: Office of Critical Event Preparedness and Response, EMORY UNIV., www.
emergency.emory.edu (last visited Mar. 26, 2015). “CEPAR serves as the center for 
Emory enterprise-wide planning for and coordinated response to catastrophic events 
affecting Emory and the broader community.” Id. 
167 Alexander Isakov et al., Safe Management of Patients with Serious Communicable 
Diseases: Recent Experience With Ebola Virus, 161 ANNALS INTERNAL MEDICINE 829, 
829–30; see also Emory Protocols, supra note 91, for a compilation of Emory’s protocols 
and external resources used in the treatment of EVD patients. 
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These preparedness teams must be assembled before an emergency 
occurs to avoid wasting invaluable time. In Emory’s case, clinical, legal, 
and administrative preparedness prior to the patients’ arrivals was critical 
to its successful clinical outcome, as well as uniting these disparate 
operational units around a common goal. 
F. Public Relations, Communications, and Education 
Once the non-clinical team is in place and a situation presents, 
practical issues involving public relations and communications must be 
addressed both internally and for the external public. Messaging of 
events, especially those implicating “fear factors,” is critical. Institutions 
must educate the public to try to dispel these fears and circumvent 
associated tendencies to panic or engage in irrational decisions. As 
Emory did, other institutions should consider: 
• Agreeing in advance on consistent external 
messaging; 
• Identifying a spokesperson with substantive 
knowledge who engenders trust of employees, patients, 
and the public; 
• Educating the media on the facts surrounding 
patient treatment while protecting patient confidentiality; 
• Demonstrating effective coordination with 
external community partners; 
• Developing a communications strategy 
addressing issues on timing and notice to internal 
management and other leaders (e.g., governing board of 
trustees); and 
• Disseminating information to employees on and 
off the care team effectively. 
Although Emory’s senior management was involved and supportive, 
the Hospital’s most visible spokespersons were clinicians and care 
providers who made public appearances to educate the media about 
medical and scientific facts of EVD, including how it is (and is not) 
transmitted. The clear and simple message, “We can fear, or we can 
care,” was intended to allay the public’s anxiety.168 Emory’s governing 
                                                                                                             
168 Susan M. Grant, Op-Ed., I’m the Head Nurse at Emory. This is Why We Wanted to 
Bring the Ebola Patients to the U.S., WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.
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boards, employees, and staff knew about events before media 
publication, where possible, through town hall-style meetings, emails, 
and information sessions. Emory’s website169 was consistently updated 
after the arrival of the first two EVD patients, including public posting of 
its clinical protocols (utilizing protocols from CDC and others).170 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Domestic concerns over EVD have waned as most U.S. patients, 
largely HCWs infected while working in West African countries, have 
been successfully treated. Though limited in its duration, the EVD crisis 
in 2014 exposed the sad truth that many American hospitals and other 
health care providers may not be clinically, operationally, or practically 
prepared to handle the impact of a highly lethal, contagious disease 
despite years of preparedness funding and efforts to assure readiness. 
Lessons learned can be universally implemented to circumvent negative 
health impacts of future infectious disease threats. Every health provider 
must commit to developing an implementable preparedness plan, 
engaging in routine preparedness exercises and training, and remaining 
on guard for the next inevitable communicable to menace the health of 
patients and the public. 
 
                                                                                                             
washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/08/06/im-the-head-nurse-at-emory-this-is-
why-we-wanted-to-bring-the-ebola-patients-to-the-u-s/. 
169 Ebola, EMORY NEWS CTR., http://news.emory.edu/tags/topic/ebola/index.html (last 
updated Mar. 9, 2015). 
170 Emory Protocols, supra note 91. 
